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CHAPTER 4 
Insurance Law 
JAMES J. MORAN, JR.* 
§ 4.1. Chapter 93A- Bad Faith Refusal to Settle Liability Claims-
Assignment of Insured's Rights. During the Survey year, the Supreme 
Judicial Court issued several significant decisions interpreting the scope 
of "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" under chapter 93A, the Con-
sumer Protection Act, in the context of insurance. From the perspective 
of insurers doing business in the Commonwealth, DiMarzo v. American 
Mutual Insurance Co. 1 was probably the most significant such decision. 
The plaintiff in that action, Louis DiMarzo, sustained serious bodily 
injuries as a result of an automobile accident, and recovered the statutory 
maximum of$2,000 in personal injury protection ("P.I.P.") benefits from 
his own insurer, Providence Washington Insurance Company ("Provi-
dence Washington"). 2 DiMarzo then brought suit against the alleged 
tortfeasor, William J. MacDonald, to recover damages for his bodily 
injuries. 3 
American Mutual Insurance Company ("American Mutual") had is-
sued an automobile liability insurance policy to MacDonald that provided 
bodily injury coverage of $20,000 per person for injuries suffered by 
others. 4 Under this policy, American Mutual had a duty to defend Mac-
Donald against any claims arising out of his operation of the insured 
automobile. 5 MacDonald, in turn, was under a duty to cooperate with 
American Mutual in any such defense. 6 
After investigating the accident, American Mutual determined that 
MacDonald was liable to DiMarzo, and that the damages for DiMarzo's 
bodily injuries exceeded its policy limits. 7 American Mutual initially took 
* JAMES J. MORAN, JR. is a senior associate with the Boston law firm of Morrison, 
Mahoney & Miller. The author wishes to acknowledge the assistance and comments of 
Professor Thomas J. McMahon, who teaches insurance law at Suffolk University Law 
School. 
§ 4.1. 1 389 Mass. 85, 449 N.E.2d 1189 (1983). 
2 Id. at 87-88, 449 N.E.2d at 1192-93. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 88, 449 N.E.2d at 1193. 
5 ld. 
8 ld. 
7 ld. 
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the position that a maximum of$18,000 was available under the policy for 
DiMarzo, because it had already reimbursed Providence Washington 
$2,000 for the P.I.P. benefits previously paid to DiMarzo. 8 Later, Amer-
ican Mutual paid another $200 to Providence Washington as reimburse-
ment for "unallocated expenses," and reduced its settlement offer to 
$17,800. 9 DiMarzo rejected this offer. 10 
In February 1976, a master appointed by the superior court to hear 
DiMarzo's tort action against MacDonald filed a report recommending 
that judgment enter for DiMarzo in the amount of $75,000. 11 MacDonald 
did not appear for the scheduled master's hearing, and American Mutual 
was unable to reach him. 12 Throughout this period the parties discussed 
settlement, and at all relevant times DiMarzo remained willing to settle for 
$20,000, the face amount of the liability coverage. 13 American Mutual, 
however, insisted that only $17,800 remained available to be paid to 
DiMarzo in settlement, and refused to offer more. 14 
The tort case went to trial and the jury returned a verdict for DiMarzo in 
the amount of $104,000. 111 With interest and costs, judgment was entered 
for $149,068.78 and an execution was issued in that amount against 
MacDonald. 16 Mter the trial, American Mutual asserted that, due to 
MacDonald's non-cooperation and failure to appear at trial, it was only 
liable for $5,000, the minimum compulsory coverage then prescribed by 
chapter 90, section 34A. 17 Accordingly, American Mutual responded to 
service of DiMarzo's execution with an offer to pay only $2,800, calcu-
lated by deducting the $2,200 paid to Providence Washington from the 
minimum statutory coverage of $5,000. 18 This offer, too, was rejected by 
DiMarzo. 19 
In December 1978, DiMarzo hired a private investigator to find Mac-
Donald. 20 The investigator was instructed to tell MacDonald that if he 
executed an assignment of all his rights and claims against American 
Mutual, DiMarzo would release him from all liability. 21 Mter a week, the 
8 Id. 
9 ld. at 88 n.1, 449 N.E.2d at 1193 n.l. 
10 Jd. at 88, 449 N.E.2d at 1193. 
11 Id. at 89, 449 N.E.2d at 1193. 
12 Jd. at 88-89, 449 N.E.2d at 1193. 
13 Id. at 89, 449 N.E.2d at 1193. 
14 ld. 
15 Id. 
18 ld. 
17 ld. 
18 ld. at 90, 449 N.E.2d at 1193-94. 
19 Id. at 90, 449 N.E.2d at 1194. 
20 Id. 
21 ld. 
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investigator located MacDonald, and MacDonald executed the agree-
ment. 22 
DiMarzo subsequently commenced a bad faith action against American 
Mutual, proceeding both individually in his own right, and as Mac-
Donald's assignee. 23 Pursuant to chapter 93A, section 9, DiMarzo sent a 
demand letter to American Mutual. 24 Although the insurer continued to 
deny liability during trial of the bad faith action, it offered $50,000 to settle 
in full all of the claims of DiMarzo and MacDonald. 25 The offer was 
rejected. 28 
At trial, DiMarzo proceeded against American Mutual on six distinct 
causes of action. Specifically, DiMarzo's amended complaint sought: (1) 
to reach and apply the $20,000 proceeds of American Mutual's policy, 
pursuant to chapter 214, section 3(9) and chapter 175, section 113; (2) 
damages for breach of the contract of insurance, (as MacDonald's assig-
nee); (3) multiple damages for failure to settle the tort claim in good faith 
(as assignee); (4) failure to settle a claim with due care (as assignee); (5) 
multiple damages for violations of chapter 176D, section 3(9), and chapter 
93A, sections 2 and 9 (individually); and (6) multiple damages for willful 
and knowing violations of chapter 93A, sections 2 and 9 (as MacDonald's 
assignee). 27 In addition, DiMarzo asked for attorney's fees on all counts. 28 
DiMarzo prevailed on all counts. 29 He was awarded double damages in 
the amount of $386,716.06, plus interest of $44,289.75, attorney's fees of 
$71,%2, and costs in the amount of$2,392.50. 30 ln addition, the trialjudge 
bel« that DiMarzo was entitled to reach and apply the full $20,000 policy 
proceeds, and awarded an additional $6,667 in attorney's fees to DiMarzo 
because of a special finding that American Mutual had lodged a frivolous 
counterclaim in violation of chapter 231, section 6F. 31 American Mutual 
requested direct appellate review by the Supreme Judicial Court. 32 
Confronted with the issue of whether the acts of American Mutual 
constituted unfair and deceptive practices under chapter 93A, 33 the Su-
22 ld. 
23 ld. 
24 ld. 
25 Id. 
28 ld. 
27 ld. 
28 Jd. Counts 2, 3, and 4 were first tried in the superior court before a jury. Counts 1, 5, 
and 6 were tried before the judge alone. ld. at 91 n.4, 449 N.E.2d at ll94 n.4. 
28 Id. at 91-92, 449 N.E.2d at ll94-95. 
30 Id. at 92, 449 N.E.2d at ll95. 
31 ld. 
32 Id. at 92-93, 449 N.E.2d at ll95. 
33 Prior to October 1979, many requirements had to be satisfied to successfully bring an 
action under chapter 93A, section 9. Now, section 9 affords a remedy to anyone who has 
been ''injured by another person's unfair or deceptive act or practice.'' The Court's analysis 
3
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preme Judicial Court upheld the superior court's findings in all material 
respects and its award of damages, with only two relatively minor 
amendments. 34 A threshold question concerned the assignability, under 
the law prior to the amendments of October 18, 1979, of MacDonald's 
chapter 93A, section 9 rights against his own insurer. 35 American Mutual 
had urged the invalidity of the assignment on the grounds that MacDonald 
did not understand the nature of the assignment instrument and that 
MacDonald did not suffer "a loss of money or property" as required by 
section 9, and therefore had no rights to assign. 36 The Court quickly 
disposed of these arguments. First, the Court noted the trial court's 
finding that MacDonald had manifested sufficient understanding and con-
sent as to the assignment, and that even if he had not, the instrument 
would have been at most voidable. 37 Second, the Court stated that the 
adverse effect of a judgment on a litigant's financial status constitutes "a 
loss of money or property" irrespective of any actual execution. 38 
American Mutual argued that deduction of the P.I.P. payment from the 
amount of the liability coverage was permissible under the terms of the 
applicable statute, chapter 90, section 34M. 39 The Court found that even if 
American Mutual had acted under statutory authority, which the Court 
expressly did not find, the insurer would not be shielded automatically 
from liability under chapter 93A. 40 The Court reiterated its previous 
rejection of the proposition that an act or practice which is authorized by 
statute cannot constitute an unfair or deceptive practice under chapter 
93A, section 2(a), emphasizing that inquiry must focus on the effect of the 
conduct on the public. According to the Court, the trier of fact must 
determine if the conduct was an unfair or deceptive act or practice. 41 The 
Supreme Judicial Court also rejected American Mutual's argument that 
the insurer was exempt from liability under chapter 93A, section 3(1)(a), 
because the acts at issue were allegedly permitted under laws adminis-
tered by the Commissioner of Insurance. 42 Finding that this was a matter 
for determination at trial, the Court concluded that there was sufficient 
of the earlier requirements has no relevance to a discussion of the current form of chapter 
93A. See id. at 93 n.7, 449 N.E.2d at 1195 n.7. 
34 See id. at 108, 449 N.E.2d at 1206. 
ss Id. at 93, 449 N.E.2d at 1195. 
38 Id. at 93 n.8, 449 N.E.2d at 1195-96 n.8. 
37 Id. at 93-94, 449 N.E.2d at 1196. 
33 Jd. at 94, 449 N.E.2d at 1196. 
89 Id. at 95, 449 N.E.2d at 1197. 
40 Jd. at 96, 449 N.E.2d at 1197. 
41 Id. (quoting Schubach v. Household Fin. Corp., 375 Mass. 133, 137, 376 N.E.2d 140, 
142 (1978)). 
42 389 Mass. at 96, 449 N.E.2d at 1197. 
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evidence from which the trial judge could have found no such exemp-
tion. 43 
Turning to the question of the superior court's findings on bad faith, the 
Court determined that "the evidence warranted the conclusion that Amer-
ican Mutual acted in bad faith and did not have a bona fide belief in the 
reasonableness of its position.'' 44 According to the Court, the evidence 
introduced at trial by DiMarzo showed that: (1) Providence Washington 
agreed to return the P.I.P. reimbursement to American Mutual in 1977, 
yet American Mutual continued to insist thereafter that its policy limits 
had been reduced; (2) American Mutual violated sound claims practice by 
not obtaining an early return of the P.I.P. reimbursement and by not 
resolving a matter of coverage in favor of its insured; (3) other insurance 
companies would offer the full liability limits of their policy, without any 
reduction on account of P. I. P payments, in similar circumstances; and ( 4) 
the Massachusetts Commissioner of Insurance understood that it was the 
practice of the insurance industry not to reduce liability policy limits by 
the amount of P.I.P. payments. 45 Considering this testimony in light of 
American Mutual's awareness of the distinct possibility that failure to 
settle with DiMarzo would lead to the entry of a substantial judgment in 
excess of policy limits against its insured, the Court found a sufficient 
basis to support the superior court's finding that American Mutual acted 
in bad faith in refusing to offer its full policy limit of $20,000. 46 
The Court also upheld the superior court's finding that the offer ex-
tended by American Mutual of $2,800 after receipt of the execution in the 
underlying tort action was made in bad faith. 47 According to the Court, the 
evidence showed that American Mutual made that offer knowing that it 
had previously waived its non-cooperation defense and had failed to 
exercise a valid reservation of a right to disclaim liability. 48 The Court 
noted that American Mutual knew as early as 1972, when MacDonald 
failed to attend his scheduled deposition in the underlying tort action, that 
its insured might not cooperate in his defense. 49 Nevertheless, American 
Mutual continued to defend MacDonald and made no effort to reserve its 
rights. 50 When MacDonald failed to appear for the master's hearing, 
American Mutual chose to proceed with that hearing without him, and, 
despite the opportunity to do so, again failed to disclaim liability or 
43 /d. at 96-97, 449 N.E.2d at 1197. 
44 !d. at 97, 449 N.E.2d at 1198. 
45 /d. at 97-98, 449 N.E.2d at 1198. 
46 /d. at 99, 449 N.E.2d at 1198. 
47 /d. 
46 /d. 
49 /d. at 99, 449 N.E.2d at 1198-99. 
110 !d. at 99, 449 N.E.2d at 1199. 
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reserve its rights as to MacDonald's apparent non-cooperation. 51 Accord-
ingly, the Court held that American Mutual waived any defense of non-
cooperation by exercising "dominion over the case at an important point 
which made a significant and irrevocable change in MacDonald's posi-
tion.'' 52 The Court specifically stated that an insurer must either expressly 
reserve its rights or disclaim liability on account of an insured's non-
cooperation no later than the beginning of a jury trial at which a defense is 
afforded to the insured. 53 
American Mutual argued that MacDonald's disappearance obviated 
any requirement of a formal notification before proceeding to trial. 54 The 
Court rejected this on the grounds that American Mutual did not take 
sufficient affirmative steps to locate and secure the cooperation of Mac-
Donald. 55 Thus, the Court upheld the trial judge's conclusion that" Amer-
ican Mutual's feeble and untimely attempt to reserve its right to disclaim 
liability was taken in bad faith." 56 
On the issue of damages, the Court ruled that although recovery under 
chapter 93A is not limited to actual damages, multiple damages awarded 
because of unfair settlement practices are limited to the amount of an 
insured's personal liability in excess of policy coverage. 57 The Court 
stated that "under chapter 93A, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for all 
losses which were the foreseeable consequences of the defendant's unfair 
or deceptive act or practice." 58 According to the Court, the judgment and 
execution entered against MacDonald were the foreseeable consequences 
of American Mutual's acts. 59 Thus, the Court opined that "[t]he damages 
suffered by MacDonald, as a result of American Mutual's wrongful re-
fusal to settle the claim, are the amount for which MacDonald became 
liable in excess of his policy coverage." 80 In this regard, the Court 
concluded that the superior court erred in its award of damages in one 
respect. 81 The Court determined that policy coverage of $20,000 could not 
be included in calculating the damages awarded under the chapter 93A 
51 Id. 
52 ld. 
58 Id. at 99-100, 449 N.E.2d at 1199. 
54 Id. at 100, 449 N.E.2d at 1199. 
&5 Id. 
58 ld. American Mutual also attacked the superior court's finding on causation. The Court 
confirmed that causation is a question of fact, but held that, on the evidence, it could not say 
that the conclusions of the trial judge were "clearly erroneous." !d. at 101, 449 N.E.2d at 
1199. 
57 Id. at 101, 449 N.E.2d at 1200. 
58 ld. 
58 ld. (citing International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 387 Mass. 841, 850, 443 N.E.2d 
1308, 1314 (1983)). 
60 389 Mass. at 101-02, 449 N.E.2d at 1200. 
81 Id. 
6
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counts because the policy proceeds were not part of the foreseeable 
damages that could be multiplied pursuant to chapter 93A. 62 
American Mutual further argued that pursuant to chapter 93A, section 
9(3), its settlement offer of $50,000 was reasonable, thus ending any 
liability for violations of chapter 93A. 63 Again, the Supreme Judicial Court 
upheld the trial judge, on the ground that determination of the reasonable-
ness of a tender of relief under chapter 93A is a question of fact. 64 
Finally, the Court discussed the reasonableness of the attorney's fees 
awarded by the superior court. 65 The Supreme Judicial Court refused to 
disturb that award, noting that the amount of attorney's fees under chap-
ter 93A is within the broad discretion of the trial judge. 66 Nevertheless, 
the Court held that a separate, additional award of attorney's fees under 
chapter 231, section 6F, was not warranted, as it would be duplicative of 
attorney's fees awarded pursuant to chapter 93A. 67 
The DiMarzo case suggests that the Supreme Judicial Court will not 
hesitate to uphold a trial court's findings with regard to chapter 93A 
liability and damage awards in the insurance context. As a policy matter, 
the Court has served notice that insurers should carefully consider the 
potential for damage awards against their insureds in excess of policy 
limits, and also the possibility of subsequent awards of double or treble 
damages, attorney's fees, and costs directly against the company. 
In this case, the superior court apparently decided that the insurance 
company was being unreasonably stubborn in not offering DiMarzo the 
entire $20,000 of policy coverage. As a result, although DiMarzo was 
initially willing to settle for $20,000, he ended up with close to $500,000. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 102, 449 N.E.2d at 1200. 
84 ld. 
83 Id. at 106, 449 N.E.2d at 1202. 
88 Id. at 101-02, 449 N.E.2d at 1200. 
87 Id. at 107, 449 N.E.2d at 1203. As modified by the Supreme Judicial Court, final 
judgment was entered in DiMarzo's favor by the superior court, as follows: Count 1, $20,000 
plus interest; Count 6,$129,068.78 plus interest, then doubled; Costs, $2,392.50; Attorney's 
Fees, $71,962. Id. Chief Justice Hennessey concurred with the opinion, but commented on 
the large damage award. Id. at 108, 449 N.E.2d at 1203 (Hennessey, C.J., concurring). He 
asserted that the findings of the superior court jury and judge were supported by the 
evidence, and the law was correctly applied. Id. Nevertheless, as a practical matter, Chief 
Justice Hennessey recognized that DiMarzo's good fortune would be, in the end, at the 
expense of insurance consumers who would be charged higher premiums for their liability 
coverage. Id. at 109, 449 N.E.2d at 1204 (Hennessey, C.J., concurring). Particularly as to 
the policy holders of"mutual" insurance companies, who possess direct ownership rights in 
such insurers by virtue of chapter 175, section 76, the DiMarzo result would appear in a 
sense to be "anti-consumer." Justice O'Connor also concurred with the Court's opinion, 
but in a lengthy and well-reasoned analysis disagreed with the Court's holding that American 
Mutual had waived its non-cooperation defense. ld. at 109-14, 449 N.E.2d at 1204-06 
(O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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The DiMarzo decision will certainly give insurers reason to pause and 
consider negotiated settlements while defending third-party tort suits 
against their insureds, even where coverage questions arise between 
insurer and insured. 
The impact of DiMarzo will have its advantages and disadvantages. 
One advantage is that more tort cases are likely to settle. Another is that 
insurance companies will be more concerned with dealing fairly and in 
good faith with their policy holders. On the other hand, certain tort 
plaintiffs may now be able to secure "windfall" settlement offers, greater 
than otherwise deserved, for no other reason than an overabundance of 
caution by insurance claims executives. 
§ 4.2. Chapter 93A - Standing - Adversely Affected Requirement -
Pattern of Unfair Claims Practices. In Van Dyke v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co., 1 the plaintiffs initiated a medical malpractice suit, and 
simultaneously proceeded separately against St. Paul Fire & Marine In-
surance Co. ("St. Paul"), the liability carrier for the defendant physi-
cians, because of the insurer's handling of the malpractice claim. 2 The 
essence of the complaint was that St. Paul, as the defendants' insurer, did 
not adequately investigate the plaintiffs' claims before rejecting a pretrial 
demand for settlement, and that St. Paul had an obligation to make a 
reasonable pretrial offer of settlement because liability was reasonably 
clear. 3 
During the course of the underlying medical malpractice litigation, and 
well prior to trial, the plaintiffs had sent a chapter 93A demand letter to St. 
Paul. 4 Enclosed with the letter was documentation supporting the plain-
tiffs' allegations of liability and "damages. 5 St. Paul had responded to 
plaintiffs' settlement demand by stating that, based on the information in 
its possession, it believed a jury might find for the defendants. 6 For this 
reason, St. Paul declined to extend a pretrial settlement offer. 7 
St. Paul moved for summary judgment, relying on a policy provision 
precluding it from settling claims without the consent of its physician-in-
sureds. 8 In addition, St. Paul argued that because liability in the underly-
ing malpractice action was not "reasonably clear" when the demand 
letter was received, it had no obligation to extend a settlement offer. 9 In 
§ 4.2. 1 388 Mass. 671, 448 N.E.2d 357 (1983). 
2 Id. at 672, 448 N.E.2d at 358. 
3 ld. 
4 ld. 
5 Id. at 673, 448 N.E.2d at 358. 
6 Id. at 673, 448 N.E.2d at 359. 
7 Id. 
8 ld. 
9 ld. 
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support of its position, St. Paul submitted affidavits establishing that the 
insurer had been advised by its trial counsel and a medical expert concern-
ing the propriety of the medical care at issue. 10 The superior court granted 
St. Paul's motion, and the plaintiffs appealed. 11 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the superior court judgment. 12 
The Court found that St. Paul declined the plaintiffs' settlement demand 
in the belief that the liability of the defendant physicians was not ''rea-
sonably clear.'' 13 According to the Court, absent sufficient information to 
support its rejection of the demand letter under chapter 93A, St. Paul 
risked a future finding of liability. 14 The Court noted, however, that if, 
before rejecting that demand, St. Paul had conducted a proper investiga-
tion that revealed that liability was unclear, then St. Paul was warranted 
in rejecting the demand. 15 
The Court reasoned that although St. Paul had not established the 
absence of a material fact in dispute concerning the propriety of its claim 
settlement practices, the plaintiffs were not adversely affected by any 
unlawful methods, acts or practices of St. Paul. 16 St. Paul's refusal to 
settle meant only that the malpractice action proceeded to trial on its 
merits. Since the plaintiffs were not injured by the lack of settlement, 
even assuming that such refusal was a violation of chapter 176D, section 
3(9)(d) and (f), the Court held that the plaintiffs had no claim under 
chapter 93A, section 9. 17 The Court did not reach the question of whether 
St. Paul's conduct was, in fact, violative of chapter 176D. Rather, the Van 
Dyke decision turned on the plaintiffs' inability to show that they were 
adversely affected by the violations alleged. 18 
Van Dyke appears to be the first appellate case interpreting the 1979 
amendment to chapter 93A. This amendment broadened the class of 
persons who could maintain actions under chapter 93A. The 1979 
amendment provided that ''any person . . . who has been injured by 
another person's use of employment of any method, act or practice 
declared unlawful by section 2 . . . or any person violating the provisions 
10 /d. 
11 /d. 
12 /d. at 672, 448 N.E.2d at 359. 
13 /d. at 673, 448 N.E.2d at 359. 
14 /d. at 678, 448 N.E.2d at 362. 
15Jd. 
16 /d. at 672, 448 N.E.2d at 359 (citing G.L. c. 93A, § 9). 
17 Id. G.L. c. l76D, § 3(9) lists the acts or omissions which constitute unfair claim 
settlement practices for insurance companies. Section 3(9)(d) covers "[r]efusing to pay 
claims without conducting a reasonable investigation based on all available information." 
Section 3(9)(f) covers '' [f]ailing to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements in which 
liability has become reasonably clear." 
18 388 Mass. at 672, 448 N.E.2d at 359. 
9
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of subsection (9) of section 3 of chapter 1760 may bring an action in the 
superior court . . . . '' 19 Because of this amendment, the Court in Van 
Dyke found the class of persons entitled to assert a claim under chapter 
93A for insurance claims settlement practices proscribed by chapter 
1760, section 3(9), to be "substantially broadened" from what it was in 
1977 when Dodd v. Commercial Union Insurance Co. was decided. 20 In 
Dodd, the Court held that only a policyholder could assert a chapter 93A 
violation against an insurance company for improper settlement of a 
claim. 21 The Van Dyke Court therefore allowed the plaintiffs to sue the 
insurance company directly. 22 
In addition, the Van Dyke Court held that one isolated act is not enough 
to impose liability on an insurance company under chapter 1760, sections 
3(9)(d) and (f). 23 The Court noted that the language in these sections 
refers to multiple refusals or failures, not to a single act. According to the 
Court, a person whose rights were adversely affected by an insurance 
company's violation of section 3(9)(d) or (f) must therefore be affected by 
a pattern of unfair claim settlement practices and not by an isolated act. 
The Court then assumed that a single act in the handling of a claim 
violates chapter 93A, section 9, "if it is an act that as a part of a pattern of 
conduct would be a violation of chapter 1760, section 3(9)(d) or (f)." 24 
This reasoning limits the liability imposed on insurance companies under 
chapter 1760, section 3(9)(f) and, therefore, their liability under chapter 
93A, section 9. 
The Appeals Court applied the Van Dyke decision during the Survey 
year in Chub v. Electric Insurance Company. 25 The plaintiff in Chub was 
injured in a two-car accident while driving his mother's car. 26 Because the 
liability insurer of the other motorist involved in the collision initially 
refused coverage, the plaintiff claimed coverage from Electric Insurance 
Company ("Electric Insurance") under the uninsured motorists portion 
of his parent's policy. 27 Later, the plaintiff obtained a settlement of 
$16,500 from the liability insurer for the other motorist. 28 Despite the lack 
of evidence that the plaintiff had sustained injuries in excess of $16,500, 
he commenced suit against Electric Insurance under chapter 93A, claim-
ing that the defendant insurer had violated chapter 1760, section 3(9)(f) 29 
19 G.L. c. 93A, § 9(1). 
20 373 Mass. 72, 365 N.E.2d 802 (1977). 
21 /d. at 81-82, 365 N.E.2d at 807. 
22 388 Mass. at 675, 448 N.E.2d at 360. 
23 /d. at 676, 448 N.E.2d at 360.61. 
""/d. at 676, 448 N.E.2d at 361. 
25 17 Mass. App. Ct. 61, 455 N.E.2d 646 (1983). 
28 /d. at 62, 455 N.E.2d at 647. 
27 /d. 
28 /d. 
'1.9 /d. 
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in refusing to pay uninsured motorist benefits. 30 The record failed to show 
that the plaintiff was "adversely affected" by this alleged violation and 
the defendant insurer moved for summary judgment. 31 The superior court 
granted the defendant's motion, and the Appeals Court affirmed. 32 
Following the reasoning in Van Dyke, the Chub court reaffirmed that a 
plaintiff must be "adversely affected" by the alleged unfair practice 
violating chapter 1760 to recover under chapter 93A, section 9. Because 
the plaintiff failed to prove damages in excess of the $16,500 he had 
received, the Appeals Court did not reach the question of whether Elec-
tric Insurance's alleged acts constituted, in fact, unfair claims settlement 
practices in violation of chapter 176P. 
§ 4.3. Chapter 93A - Delay in Paying a Meritorious Claim. The issue in 
Swanson v. Bankers Life Company 1 concerned an insurer's delay in 
recognizing and paying a meritorious claim. 2 The plaintiff, Swanson, had 
a group insurance policy with the defendant, Bankers Life Company 
("Bankers Life"). 3 The policy provided coverage for Swanson's wife 
through the calendar year following Mr. Swanson's retirement for any 
medical condition existing on the date of his retirement which caused her 
to become totally disabled. 4 Mr. Swanson retired on August 31, 1977, and 
in the spring of 1978, Mrs. Swanson was hospitalized for the treatment of 
lung cancer. 5 
Mr. and Mrs. Swanson submitted claims under the Bankers Life policy 
for reimbursement of expenses incurred. 8 Bankers Life initially took the 
position that coverage was not available because Mrs. Swanson's treat-
ment did not relate to a condition causing total disability that had existed 
on the date of Mr. Swanson's retirement. 7 The plaintiffs responded that 
medical records in the insurer's possession would authenticate the claim. 8 
Bankers Life then requested that a "statement of claim form" be com-
pleted by Mrs. Swanson's attending physician. 9 Upon receipt and review 
of that form, Bankers Life continued to assert that Mrs. Swanson had a 
"new condition" for which benefits were not payable under the Bankers 
311 Id. 
31 Id. at 61, 455 N.E.2d at 646. 
32 Id. at 63, 455 N.E.2d at 647. 
§ 4.3. 1 389 Mass. 345, 450 N.E.2d 577 (1983). 
2 Id. at 347, 450 N.E.2d at 579. 
3 Id. 
• Id. 
~ Id. 
6 ld. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
8 Id. 
11
Moran: Chapter 4: Insurance Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1983
84 1983 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW § 4.3 
Life policy, which covered only disabilities existing at the time Mr. 
Swanson's employment terminated. 10 
In due course, the plaintiffs' counsel sent Bankers Life what purported 
to be a written demand for relief under chapter 93A. 11 Although Bankers 
Life failed to reply in writing as required by section 9 of that statute, a 
representative of the insurer informed the plaintiffs' counsel by telephone 
that Bankers Life had no evidence that Mrs. Swanson's malignancy 
existed on August 31, 1977. 12 Finally, after further correspondance with 
plaintiffs and their doctors and hospitals, Bankers Life received a diag-
nostic radiology report indicating that Mrs. Swanson had a lung lesion as 
early as January, 1977, well prior t~:her husband's retirement. 13 Accord-
ingly, on April 23, 1979, Bankers Life informed the Swansons' counsel 
that it intended to pay all benefits due under the contract. 14 On May 1, 
1979, Bankers Life forwarded payment drafts to the Swansons' counsel, 
representing in total the sums then due under the policy. 15 
Notwithstanding this payment, the Swansons continued to pursue their 
claim under chapter 93A against Bankers Life. 18 The plaintiffs contended 
"that Bankers Life had an obligation to investigate the c~aim with greater 
diligence than it did." 17 This allegation was based on chapter 1760, 
section 3(9)(d), which defines an insurer's refusal "to pay claims without 
conducting a reasonable investigation based upon all available informa-
tion" as an unfair claim settlement practice. 18 
The district court judge found for the plaintiffs in the amount which the 
parties agreed was payable under the policy, and then separately awarded 
damages under chapter 93A at double that amount, plus attorney's fees. 19 
On appeal by Bankers Life to the appellate division of the district court 
department, the judgment below was vacated. 20 The appellate division 
found no chapter 93A violations, and ordered that the insurer pay only its 
policy proceeds. 21 The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court. 22 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argued that the insurer's negligent failure to 
investigate their claim with reasonable diligence, and the resulting delay 
10 ld. 
11 Id. at 348, 450 N.E.2d at 579. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. 
1
• Id. 
15 Id. 
18 See id. 
17 Id. at 348-49, 450 N.E.2d at 579-80. 
18 Id. at 349, 450 N.E.2d at 580. 
18 Id. at 346, 450 N.E.2d at 578. 
'Ml Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 347-50, 450 N.E.2d at 579-80. 
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in Bankers Life's payment of sums due under the policy, was an unfair or 
deceptive trade practice in violation of chapter 1760, section 3(9)( d) and, 
thus, chapter 93A, section 9. 23 Although the Court acknowledged that, in 
theory, recovery could be had for a deceptive act resulting from a defen-
dant's negligence, it nevertheless held that "not every negligent act is 
unfair or deceptive and thus unlawful" under chapter 93A, section 2. 24 
The Court rejected the plaintiffs' allegations, 25 stating that the defen-
dant had not acted deceptively because Bankers Life's position on the 
claim was clearly stated to the plaintiffs. 26 In addition, the Court held that 
the defendant had not acted unfairly since the plaintiffs' counsel knew 
that to obtain coverage, Mrs. Swanson's illness had to exist on the date of 
Mr. Swanson's retirement. 27 Therefore, under chapter 93A, section 9, as 
it read prior to the 1979 amendment, the burden of proof to show a 
pre-existing condition was on the plaintiff. 28 
The Swanson case suggests that the Court will be reluctant to find 
chapter 93A violations when an insurer pays, albeit late, the full amount 
of a claim due under its policy. The Court in Swanson indicated that 
section 3(9) of chapter 1760, as applied through chapter 93A, is not aimed 
at penalizing the methods and practices employed in handling particular 
claims by innocent, though possibly negligent, insurers. This is true even 
where an insured can show "technical" violations of the claims handling 
standards of section 3(9), so long as no "actual damage" results from the 
insurer's conduct. In Swanson, Bankers Life's only "unfair" act was its 
failure to promptly accept liability for the Swansons' claim which, as a 
matter of public policy, should not subject an insurer to punitive damages 
after the omission has been rectified voluntarily and payment of policy 
proceeds has been made. 
§ 4.4. Excess Liability Insurance - Exhaustion Of Underlying Limits. 
The plaintiff in Thomson National Press Co. v. National Union Fire 
Insurance Co. 1 manufactured large printing presses. Believing itself vul-
nerable to substantial personal injury claims by those who used the 
presses, Thomson National Press Co. ("Thomson") procured liability 
insurance in succeeding layers of coverage. 2 
Commercial Union Insurance Company ("Commercial Union") pro-
23 Id. at 349, 450 N.E.2d at 580. 
'M ld. 
2~ Id. 
28 ld. 
27 Id. at 350, 450 N.E.2d at 580. 
28 ld. 
§ 4.4. 1 16 Mass. App. Ct. 242, 451 N.E.:id 432 (1983). 
2 Id. at 243, 451 N.E.2d at 433. 
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vided a primary policy with limits of $300,000 for each occurrence and 
$300,000 aggregate, for the period September 23, 1975 to September 23, 
1978. 3 A first excess layer policy was provided by National Union Fire 
Insurance Company ("National") for the period September 23, 1976 
through September 23, 1977,4 with aggregate and per occurrence limits of 
$200,000. 5 During the year that Commercial Union's primary policy and 
National's first excess policy were both in effect, Thomson thus had 
liability coverage totaling $500,000 each occurrence and $500,000 aggre-
gate. 6 
From July 7, 1976 through July 21, 1977, Thomson also had an excess 
umbrella insurance policy with Affiliated Factory Mutual Insurance Co. 
("Affiliated"). 7 This policy was not coordinated with the effective dates 
of the others, however, and the Affiliated umbrella policy expired during 
the policy periods specified in the primary and excess contracts of Com-
mercial Union and National, described above. 8 Because of the lapse of 
Affiliated's coverage, Thomson obtained an umbrella insurance policy 
from Chicago Insurance Co. ("Chicago") for the period July 21, 1977 
through July 21, 1978. 9 Chicago limited its liability for each occurrence, 
and in the aggregate, to $2,000,000 in excess of underlying insurance, 
which the Chicago policy required to be maintained with limits of 
$500,000 each occurrence, $1,000,000 aggregate. 10 The Chicago umbrella 
policy designated Commercial Union's policy as the primary underlying 
insurance. 11 
The underlying insurance requirement of$500,000 in the Chicago policy 
presented a problem because Commercial Union's primary policy was 
written with limits of only $300,000. 12 To meet this requirement, Thomson 
purchased additional coverage from National for the period July 21, 1977 
through September 23, 1977. 13 The face of this policy, labelled "excess 
third party liability policy," named Commercial Union as the primary 
insurer with underlying limits of $300,000 each occurrence and in the 
aggregate. 14 National then limited its liability on this second excess policy 
to $200,000 each occurrence, with an aggregate liability of $700,000. 15 
3 /d. 
4 /d. at 244, 451 N.E.2d at 434. 
5Jd. 
6Jd. 
7 /d. 
BJd. 
9Jd. 
10 /d. 
llJd. 
11 /d. at 245, 451 N.E.2d at 434. 
13Jd. 
!4Jd. 
!5Jd. 
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With the issuance of that excess policy, Thomson's total coverage from 
Commercial Union and National was $500,000 each occurrence and 
$1,000,000 in the aggregate, thus apparently meeting Chicago's underlying 
insurance requirement. 16 
At the time National's second excess liability policy was issued on July 
21, 1977, Commercial Union was defending Thomson, pursuant to the 
terms of its primary insurance policy, against a number of claims involv-
ing bodily injuries that occurred between September 23, 1976 and July 21, 
1977. 17 Commercial Union ultimately paid out $300,000 on these claims, 
exhausting the aggregate limits of its primary policy. 18 Additionally, on its 
first excess policy, National paid $200,000 on bodily injury claims arising 
during the same period, September 23, 1976 to July 21, 1977. 19 
Subsequently, two more claims involving bodily injuries occurring after 
July 21, 1977 and before September 23, 1977, were asserted against 
Thomson and presented to National under its second excess liability 
policy. 2° Commercial Union had refused liability on these claims because 
the $300,000 aggregate liability limit of its primary policy had already been 
exhausted. 21 
At trial, the parties stipulated that when National issued its second 
excess coverage policy on July 21, 1977, neither Thomson nor National 
1& Id. 
IT Jd. 
18 ld. 
Is Id. 
'JJJ ld. 
21 Id. The chronology of the above claims with reference to the effective dates and 
coverages of Thomson's various liability policies is illustrated in the following time table, 
Table "A": 
1975 
9/23175 
1976 1977 
C.U. Primary Coverage ($300,000)* 
9/23/76 9/23177 
National-Ist Excess 
layer ($200,000) 
717/7 6 7121177 
Affiliated 
7/21/77 
Chicago 
7/21-9/23177 
National Ex-
cess 3d Party 
1978 
9/23/78 
7/21/78 
* Two claims were submitted between 9/23176 and 7/21/77; C. U. Primary Coverage 
paid its limit of$300,000. Two more claims were submitted between 7121177 and 9/23/77. 
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knew that pre-exisiting but unreported claims would exhaust the primary 
insurance provided by Commercial Union. 22 The parties also agreed that 
if Commercial Union's underlying policy had an aggregate liability limit of 
$300,000, then no other insurance policy was in place to provide primary 
aggregate limits, not previously exhausted, for the policy period of Na-
tional's second excess coverage. 23 
The superior court found that on July 21, 1977, Thomson had the 
primary coverage required by National's excess coverage policy. 24 In 
addition, the court concluded that on July 21, 1977, for a substantial 
premium, National had taken the risk that the claims against the primary 
carrier, Commercial Union, might eventually exhaust the primary cover-
age. Consequently, the superior court ruled that National was contractu-
ally obligated under its second excess policy to handle claims which 
involved injuries occurring during the policy period. 25 
Upon appeal, the central issue was whether the required underlying 
coverage had been "exhausted" with respect to claims brought under the 
second National excess policy. 26 The Appeals Court vacated the trial 
court's decision, holding that Thomson did not maintain the primary 
coverage in place as required by National's policy. 27 The court rejected 
Thomson's argument that the second National policy was ambiguous and 
therefore should be construed in the insured's favor. 28 Looking at the 
express language of the policy, the court stated that it "must construe the 
words in the policy in their usual and ordinary sense." 29 Because the 
court found no ambiguity in the policy's specifications of the underlying 
limits, it refused to construe the second excess policy strictly against 
National. :"' After deciding that neither the declarations nor the insuring 
agreements of National's policy were ambiguous, the court read those 
provisions as reflecting National's agreement only "to provide a limited 
amount of coverage for damages in excess of that protection afforded by 
Commercial [Union's] underlying insurance." 31 
The Appeals Court then addressed the question of whether Thomson 
could base its claim for excess coverage on the exhaustion of Commercial 
Union's liability due to payment of claims for injuries occurring before 
22 16 Mass. App. Ct. at 245, 451 N.E.2d at 434. 
28 Id. at 245-46, 451 N.E.2d at 434-35. 
u I d. at 246, 451 N.E.2d at 435. The court found that the limits of Commercial Union's 
primary coverage was $300,000 per occurrence, aggregate $500,000-$1,000,000. Jd. 
28 ld. 
28 See id. at 246-49, 451 N.E.2d at 435-36. 
21 ld. at 248-49, 451 N.E.2d at 435-36. 
28 Id. at 246, 451 N.E.2d at 435. 
28 Jd. at 248, 451 N.E.2d at 436. 
30 ld. 
31 ld. 
16
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National issued the policy to cover losses for injuries sustained during 
National's policy period. 32 The court found for the insurance company, 
concluding that Thomson was attempting to convert National from an 
excess to an underlying insurer for the injuries occurring during its policy 
period, in conflict with the express terms of the policy. 33 According to the 
court, the endorsement clearly provided that National's excess coverage 
was available only when the stated aggregate limits were exhausted by 
claims based upon bodily injury or property damage occurring during the 
policy period, July 21, 1977 through September 23, 1977. 34 
To understand the significance of this decision, and how the case arose 
in the first place, the availability of the "drop down" policy provision 
typically found in excess liability policies similar to National's must be 
recognized. 35 Such policies typically provide that in the event of "exhaus-
tion" of underlying coverage, the excess policy "drops down" and re-
sponds to the claim on a first dollar basis to the same extent as the 
exhausted policy would have done. 36 No such standard provision existed 
in Thomson's policy with National. The court, therefore, correctly placed 
the burden of the underlying insurance gaps on the insured and the broker 
who structured the coverage, rather than on the excess insurer. It is also 
noteworthy that the court in this case could find no ambiguity, since 
National's excess liability policy contained clear language. To rely on the 
precedential value of this case, therefore, an insurance company similarly 
must use clear policy language. 
§ 4.5. Insurer's Duty To Defend - Coverage Exclusions. During the 
Survey year, the Appeals Court addressed the question of an insurer's 
duty to defend its insureds in two decisions. In the first case, Terrio v. 
McDonough, 1 an insured was sued by an ex-lover for sexual assault and 
battery. 2 The insured denied plaintiff's claim, alleging his own negligence 
rather than intentional conduct. In addition, the insured impleaded 
32 ld. 
33 Id. at 248-49, 451 N.E.2d at 436. 
a< Jd. According to the court, if Thomson believed that pre-policy-period injuries could 
exhaust the insurance underlying National's excess coverage, its misunderstanding was not 
due to any failure by National to use language which Thomson could " 'reasonably under-
stand to be the scope of [its] coverage.' "Id. (quoting Slater v. United States Fid. & Guar. 
Co., 379 Mass. 801, 803, 400 N.E.2d 1256, 1258 (1980)). 
35 See, e.g., G. COUCH, 16 COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW. 2D § 62:48 at 
484-495 (Rev. ed. 1983); 1 THE UMBRELLA BooK: ANALYSIS OF COMMERCIAL UMBRELLA 
AND EXCESS LIABILITY FORMS (1981). See a/so A. WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND 
DISPUTES § 6.12, at 257 (1982). 
aa Id. See Molina v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 574 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1978). But see 
Reserve Ins. Co. v. Pisciotta, 30 Cal.3d 800, 640 P.2d 764, 180 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1982). 
§ 4.5. 1 16 Mass. App. Ct. 163, 450 N.E.2d 190 (1983). 
2 Id. at 164, 450 N.E.2d at 192. 
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Hartford Fire Insurance Co. (the "Hartford"), seeking coverage and an 
obligation to defend under its standard homeowners policy. 3 
Addressing the issue of the Hartford's liability, the Appeals Court 
reaffirmed the established rule that "an insurer has no obligation to 
defend when the allegations of a complaint describe with precision inten-
tional conduct of a defendant which the insurance policy expressly ex-
cludes from coverage." 4 The court stated that the allegations in the 
complaint determine an insurance company's obligation to defend against 
a liability claim. 5 Consequently, according to the court, no duty to defend 
arises unless the insurer is, or should be aware of, facts indicating liability 
within the coverage of the policy. 6 
The second case, Sterilite Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 involved 
a manufacturer of molded plastics that was insured under a comprehen-
sive general liability ("C.G.L. ") policy issued by Continental Casualty 
Co. ("Continental"). 8 Sterilite manufactured plastic trays which were 
sold by a distributor, WRH, to Henry Heide, Inc. ("Heide"). 9 Alleging 
that the trays were unfit for their intended use and not in conformity with 
the sample, 10 Heide sued WRH, Sterilite, and the material supplier, Dow, 
for damages in the amount of $600,000. 11 
The action against Sterilite was commenced on July 21, 1975, and 
Continental provisionally assumed its defense. 12 On August 21, 1975 
Continental disclaimed responsibility with regard to damage to the trays, 
and on January 5, 1976 disclaimed all liability. 13 Sterilite then engaged its 
own counsel and sought a judicial declaration that Continental was ob-
liged to undertake its defense. 14 The superior court held that Continental 
had breached its duty under the C.G.L. policy to defend its insured, and 
thus was obliged to indemnify Sterilite for the fees incurred for private 
defense counsel. 15 The Appeals Court, considering whether Continental 
had a duty to defend Sterilite in the third-party action commenced by 
Heide, affirmed. 16 According to the court, Continental had to either con-
3 ld. 
• ld. at 168, 450 N.E.2d at 193. 
5 Id. at 166, 450 N.E.2d at 193. 
8 Id. at 167, 450 N.E.2d at 193. 
7 17 Mass. App. Ct. 316, 458 N.E.2d 338 (1983). 
8 ld. at 316, 458 N.E.2d at 340. 
9 ld. at 317, 458 N.E.2d at 340. 
10 ld. 
11 ld. 
12 /d. 
13 Id. 
14 ld. 
15 Id. at 325, 458 N.E.2d at 344. 
18 Id. at 317-18, 458 N.E.2d at 340. 
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tinue the defense, or make an appropriate demonstration that the third-
party claim did not in fact include matters for which there was coverage 
and thus absolve itself of a defense obligation. 17 
Discussing first the standard used to determine whether an insurer has a. 
duty to defend, the court noted with approval that it is well-established 
Massachusetts law that: 
the question of the initial duty of a liability insurer to defend third-party 
actions against the insured is decided by matching the third-party complaint 
with the policy provisions: if the allegations of the complaint are "rea-
sonably susceptible" of an interpretation that they state or adumbrate a 
claim covered by the policy terms, the insurer must undertake the defense. 18 
This broad standard includes all foreseeable losses lying within the range 
of the allegations in the complaint. 19 Using this analysis, the Appeals 
Court agreed with the superior court's finding that Heide's complaint was 
sufficient to invoke the duty of the insurer to defend under the policy 
provisions. 20 In matching policy provisions against the plaintiff's com-
plaint for purposes of this analysis, the court held, the complaint's allega-
tions must be read broadly rather than literally or narrowly. 21 According 
to the court, "for the duty of defense to arise, the underlying complaint 
need only show a possibility that the liability claim falls within the insur-
ance coverage." 22 
The Appeals Court, therefore, found the reference in Heide's complaint 
to "loss of return on investment" adequate. 23 This claim, the court stated, 
would constitute damages falling within the C.G.L. policy's coverage 
against liability for property damage, defined by the policy in part as "loss 
of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or 
destroyed provided such loss of use is caused by an occurrence during the 
policy period." 24 
The court then analyzed whether exclusions in the 1973 edition of the 
C.G.L. policy operated to absolve Continental of its duty to defend. 25 
According to the court, Exclusion (n) clearly removed the "named in-
sured's products" from coverage, but appeared inapplicable to the dam-
ages alleged by Heide for losses other than those associated with the 
trays. 28 Of greater significance, in the court's view, was Exclusion (m), 
17 ld. 
18 Id. at 318, 458 N.E.2d at 340. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 319, 458 N.E.2d at 341. 
21 ld. 
22 ld. 
23 Id. at 320, 458 N.E.2d at 340. 
24 ld. 
23 Id. at 321, 458 N.E.2d at 342. 
28 ld. 
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often called the "business risk" exclusion, by which coverage under the 
C.G.L. does not apply: 
to loss of use of tangible property which has not been physically injured or 
destroyed resulting from ... (2) the failure of the named insured's products 
... to meet the level of performance, quality, fitness or durability war-
ranted or represented by the named insured; but ... does ... apply to loss 
of use of other tangible property resulting from the sudden and accidental 
physical injury to or destruction of the named insured's products ... after 
such products ... have been put to use by any person ... other than the 
insured. 27 
In analyzing Exclusion (m), the court distinguished between the physi-
cal breakdown of the insured's product and the mere failure of the product 
to perform as warranted ~ter sale to and usage by another. 28 According to 
the court, the later "failure" is a business risk and therefore excluded 
from coverage. 29 A breakdown situation, however, is not so excluded. 30 
The court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged a breakdown 
situation. 31 
Although the duty to defend may temporarily attach, the court noted, 
an insurer has the right to show that an exclusion does in fact apply to 
eliminate coverage. 32 The court held that through declaratory action, an 
insurer frees itself of the duty to defend by demonstrating with conclusive 
effect that the third party cannot establish a claim within the insurance. 33 
In sum, Sterilite illustrates that in Massachusetts the duty to defend 
rules are very broad. The losses covered by the policy need not be 
directly stated in the complaint. A duty to defend will attach if the loss is 
foreseeable within the range of allegations in the complaint. Conse-
quently, where there is the slightest doubt, an insurer in Massachusetts 
would be better advised to defend its insured from the outset while 
commencing a declaratory action to determine the scope of its duty to 
defend, rather than to deny coverage and defense, forcing its insured to 
incur fees and expenses for private defense counsel while the insurer's 
obligations remain uncertain. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
28 ld. at 322, 458 N.E.2d at 343. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. at 323, 458 N.E.2d at 343. 
32 Id. at 323-24, 458 N.E.2d at 344. 
33 Id. at 323-24, 458 N.E.2d at 343-44. 
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